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Abstract 
Purpose – The aim of the present research was to investigate how a negative decision 
outcome generated by a leader in a hasty, timely, or delayed manner impacts upon the need 
for, and the effectiveness of apologies to restore followers’ trust. 
Design/methodology/approach – Data were collected using five studies in which the effects 
of timing of an incorrect decision on the trust repair process were investigated. 
Findings – In the aftermath of a leader’s failure, followers experienced a delayed incorrect 
decision as a more severe transgression than a hasty or a timely incorrect decision. This effect 
was mediated by procedural fairness concerns (Study 1). The present findings also revealed 
an interesting paradox. Specifically, in the delayed condition followers expressed the highest 
need for an apology (Studies 2 and 3), but at the same time expected an apology to be less 
effective for enhancing trustworthiness than in the timely and the hasty condition (Study 3). 
Moreover, we also showed that the actual provision of an apology was effective for restoring 
both trustworthiness (Study 4) and trust (Studies 4 and 5) in the timely and the hasty 
condition, but ineffective in the delayed condition.  
Implications – The present research shows that when the outcome of a decision is uncertain, 
it is better to make a decision (too) soon rather than (too) late. 
Originality/value – Despite the ubiquity of timing errors in daily life, our studies are the first 
to focus on the role of timeliness of decisions in the trust repair process.  
Keywords: decision timing; delays; trust; apologies; leader failure; leader-follower 
relationships; fairness 
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The Impact of Decision Timing on the Effectiveness of Leaders’ Apologies to Repair 
Followers’ Trust in the Aftermath of Leader Failure 
 On almost a daily basis leaders have to make decisions that can either benefit or harm 
their organization, their employees, and themselves (Messick & Bazerman, 1996). When leaders 
make inadequate decisions a host of negative consequences may arise, which can hamper 
followers’ future collaboration and compliance (De Cremer, 2013). Importantly, prior research 
has also indicated that leader failure decreases followers’ confidence and trust in this leader 
(Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Trust is an important element of organizational functioning and 
influences leadership effectiveness considerably (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), and for that reason 
leaders need to be able to restore trust once it is violated. One relevant way to address trust 
violations in an effective way is through the delivery of an apology (Lazare, 2004).  
 In the present paper, we investigated the type of transgressions that can be restored 
through the use of apologies in the context of dyadic leader-follower relationships. We aim to 
show that, in the case of an incorrect decision by a leader, the timing of when the decision was 
made can influence how much a trust repair strategy (by means of delivering an apology) is 
needed. Did the leader make the incorrect decision in a hasty, timely, or delayed fashion? 
Leaders can quickly make decisions but can also miss deadlines for those same decisions. 
Although not much research attention has been devoted to the issue of timeliness in explaining 
leadership effectiveness, prior research has revealed that delayed decisions lead to negative 
consequences in terms of organizational performance and leadership perceptions (e.g., Cha & 
Edmonston, 2006; Gilliland, 1993; Truxillo, Bauer, Campion, & Paronto, 2002). The present 
research aimed to show that the timing of a leader’s incorrect decision also influences the 
effectiveness of an apology for enhancing trust repair. 
Trust in Leader-Follower Relationships 
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 Almost any decision or exchange that we engage in includes some sort of trust 
evaluation, either towards a person, an organization, or even society as a whole. As such, trust 
represents a fundamental ingredient to coordinate and facilitate social relationships (Bohnet & 
Croson, 2004). In this regard, the integrative model of Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) 
makes an important conceptual distinction between trustworthiness and trust. Trustworthiness is 
a multidimensional construct that comprises the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee 
(Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). These three facets are viewed as 
antecedents of trust, which has been defined as the intention to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations of the actions of another person (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). 
In the current contribution, we take trustworthiness and trust into account when investigating the 
reconciliation process in the aftermath of leader failure, because the leader-member exchange 
theory describes both these concepts as crucial elements of effective relationships between 
leaders and their followers (see Liden & Graen, 1980). 
 Indeed, researchers have identified the presence of trust as a critical prerequisite for 
leaders to empower their followers (see Gómez & Rosen, 2001; Mayer et al., 1995). Because of 
high trust employees effectively complete their jobs and go above and beyond the call of duty in 
their work without clear compensation (Dirks & Skarlicki, 2004). In addition, a meta-analysis of 
Dirks and Ferrin (2002) revealed that trust in leadership also has significant positive relationships 
with employees’ outcomes, including organizational citizenship behavior, job satisfaction, and 
commitment to the leader’s decisions. Yet, in everyday life leaders are confronted with many 
challenging situations which offer numerous opportunities for violating their followers’ trust. 
One way in which leaders may violate trust is by making decisions that fail to reach desired goals 
and subsequently produce unfavorable outcomes for their followers. Acknowledging the 
ubiquity of such leaders’ failures, a vital question that arises is how followers’ trust can be 
regained in the aftermath of leader failure. 
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Trust Repair: The Use of Apologies 
  The trust repair strategy that received by far the most research attention is the provision 
of an apology (De Cremer, 2010). An apology is generally defined as a combined statement of 
an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and an expression of guilt (Lazare, 2004). Another crucial 
element of a persuasive apology is an explicit promise of future trustworthy behavior (Scher & 
Darley, 1997). In the aftermath of a trust violation, an apology can thus be seen as an adequate 
response because it implies that the transgressor distances him- or herself from prior actions. 
 A considerable body of research has shown that offering a sincere apology might indeed 
be an effective strategy to enhance trust (e.g., Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Schwartz, 
1978; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). Specifically, these studies found that transgressors 
who apologize are rated more favorably and as less culpable than transgressors who do not 
apologize. However, evidence is growing that apologies do not always facilitate the repair of 
trust (De Cremer & Desmet, 2012). The theory of impression management suggests that 
apologies can be ineffective due to the acknowledgment of guilt (Schlenker, 1980). In line with 
this theory, Sigal, Hsu, Foodim, and Betman (1988) found that a denial of misconduct is a more 
effective strategy to obtain votes for a political candidate than the provision of an apology. 
Moreover, prior research revealed that the type of violation plays a crucial role in determining 
whether apologies are effective to repair broken trust (e.g., Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; 
Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). Specifically, 
apologies are effective to enhance trust after a competence-based trust violation. However, when 
the transgression reflects a lack of integrity (such as the sexual or financial misconduct in the 
study of Sigal and colleagues) apologies are ineffective to repair broken trust. A similar result 
was obtained by Leunissen, De Cremer, Reinders Folmer, and van Dijke (2013), who found that 
an apology leads to more forgiveness after unintentional than after intentional transgressions. 
However, apologies may not only be ineffective, but even counterproductive. In this regard, 
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Kellogg (2007) has referred to apologies as “highly risky strategies” that can make “a bad 
situation worse” (p. 21). Empirical research supports the idea that apologies can backfire and 
lead to a further decline of trust (Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004). 
 How can the mixed results of these prior studies be explained? Previous research has 
shown that the effectiveness of an apology as a means to repair broken trust is dependent on 
whether people are willing to rebuild their relationship with the transgressor (Tomlinson et al., 
2004). This willingness strongly depends on how the trust violation occurred. Although much is 
known about how the type of violation (for instance in terms of competence versus integrity or 
unintentional versus intentional violations) influences the trust repair process, a crucial category 
of organizational trust violations − that is, delayed decisions and missed deadlines − has not yet 
been examined. In the present research, we argue that a leader’s decision timing, another 
important dimension of transgression, is a crucial antecedent of whether apologies will be able to 
positively influence trustworthiness and trust.  
The Role of Decision Timing 
 There is some prior research that indicated the importance of the role of timing for the 
trust repair process. In this venture, Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, and Murnighan (2008) found that 
the timing of a trust breach (i.e., whether the breach occurred at an early or later phase of the 
relationship) influences the restoration process. Investigating another aspect of timing, Frantz 
and Benningson (2005) reported that whether an apology was offered at the beginning or the end 
of a conversation impacts its effectiveness to enhance recovery. Specifically, these studies 
revealed that getting off on the wrong foot has especially devastating long-term consequences for 
trust and that later apologies are more effective to restore trust than earlier ones. However, no 
previous studies investigated how the timing of an incorrect decision influences the need for and 
the effectiveness of apologies as a trust repair strategy. This lack in the literature is regretful 
because leaders are regularly confronted with deadlines. Delays thus appear to be a ubiquitous 
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APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    7 
problem for organizations (De Cremer, 2013; Tukel & Rom, 1998), making attempts to repair 
trust under such circumstances highly relevant. With regard to the timing dimension, leaders’ 
decisions can either be generated hasty (when the decision is made too early, without considering 
all relevant information), timely (when the decision is made at the appropriate or opportune 
moment in time), or delayed (when the decision is made too late, for example after the passing of 
a predefined deadline).  
 What happens when decisions are delivered in a timely fashion, too soon, or too late? 
Hogan and Kaiser (2005) have argued that “good leaders make good decisions in a timely way” 
(p. 173). In line with this statement, timeliness has been associated with positive outcomes in 
terms of leadership effectiveness and organizational performance (see Bluedorn & Denhardt, 
1988; Jacobs, 2005; Snowden & Boone, 2007). With regard to the outcomes of decisions, from 
this literature it is not clear whether these positive consequences are only applicable to timely 
decisions that had positive outcomes, or also when the outcome of the decision process was 
negative. With regard to the consequences of hasty decisions the results are more mixed. On the 
one hand, some studies have shown that an overly fast decision-making style may reflect 
negatively upon leaders (e.g., Gavin & Roberto, 2001). On the other hand, there are also studies 
which have indicated that a fast decision-making style is positively related to organizational 
performance, as fast decisions are associated with efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Bluedorn, 
2002). With respect to delayed decisions, the results of previous studies are more 
straightforward. People have a strong aversion for delays, especially when a delay affects desired 
outcomes and incur costs (Blount & Janicik, 2001). Postponing a decision can lead to important 
deadlines being missed, which can have severe consequences for team processes and outcomes 
(Mohammed, Hamilton, & Lim, 2009). Moreover, leaders who employ a delayed decision-
making style are perceived as ineffective, lazy, and even hypocritical (Cha & Edmonston, 2006).  
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APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    8 
 Taken together, these studies show that particularly a delayed decision-making style is 
harmful for leadership effectiveness and social reputation. What is interesting to note, however, 
is that timing of a decision in most studies refers to the process of making decisions, and does not 
necessarily imply positive or negative outcomes. Below, we argue that the timing dimension will 
be highly relevant to followers in cases where they suffer negative outcomes due to a leader’s 
(hasty, timely, or delayed) erroneous decision.  
Being Wrong and Too Late: Implications for Trust Repair  
 From a purely instrumental perspective, followers should not care about the leader’s 
decision timing when this decision failed to reach a desired outcome. Indeed, in such instances 
the leader’s decision generated a negative outcome, regardless of the timing of this decision. 
However, people are not only influenced by the outcomes of a decision, but also by the way the 
decision has been reached. The distinction between distributive and procedural fairness helps to 
understand why decisions that are incorrect and delayed are not well received. Distributive 
fairness refers to the perception of fairness of received outcomes and allocations (Cropanzano & 
Ambrose, 2001). Yet, people’s satisfaction with tangible outcomes is also determined by the 
degree to which fair procedures are applied in order to arrive at this outcome. Procedures are 
considered fair when, for example, they are free from bias and when accurate information is 
collected and used in the decision process (Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980).  
 Rutte and Messick (1995) suggested that when people’s outcomes are unfavorable, they 
start to “search for one or more rules that were violated” (p. 247). Particularly relevant in the 
present context is the finding that when outcomes are negative and distributive fairness is at a 
low level, people are especially influenced by and concerned with procedural fairness (Brockner 
& Wiesenfeld, 1996). Hence, when a leader’s decision hurts the interests of his or her followers, 
followers will pay special attention to the way in which the decision was made. In this respect, 
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APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    9 
timeliness can be considered as an important dimension for evaluating procedural fairness (e.g., 
Bies & Moag, 1986; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996).  
 Indeed, recent justice research investigating the speed of decision-making as a procedural 
fairness principle found that overly slow decision-making processes trigger perceptions of 
unfairness (see Valkeapää & Seppälä, 2014; see also Gilliland, 1993; Truxillo et al., 2002). 
When decisions last much longer than expected, uncertainty increases and people may start 
looking for parties at fault and possible reasons for the delays (Lind, 2001). Similarly, a fast 
decision process might also be perceived as unfair as it indicates that there might be problems in 
the adherence of proper decision-making procedures, as full adherence to procedural fairness 
principles takes time (Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009). Consequently, fast decision-making 
processes could also be negatively related to perceived fairness. Yet, the study of Valkeapää and 
Seppälä provides initial evidence that the negative effects of delayed decisions, in terms of 
lowered procedural fairness concerns, are more pronounced than the negative effects of hasty 
decisions. This finding can be explained when taking the concept of uncertainty into account. 
Indeed, a slow decision creates both uncertainty in the short-term (greater time spent under 
uncertainty) and long-term (concerns about the quality of the decision-making process), while a 
fast decision creates only concerns about the quality of the decision-making process as it 
minimalizes short-term uncertainty (see Valkeapää & Seppälä, 2014). In sum, it can thus be 
expected that, compared to timely decisions, especially delayed decisions will lead to low 
procedural fairness perceptions. 
 A range of studies found that negative reactions are most prominent when low 
distributive fairness is accompanied by unfair procedures (for an overview, see Brockner & 
Wiesenfeld, 1996). Put otherwise, the combination of low procedural fairness and low outcome 
favorability engenders the most negative reactions. Hence, in the aftermath of a leader failure 
which results in a negative decision outcome, followers will react most negatively when the 
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APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    10 
procedural aspects of the decision-making process have not been well secured, like when a 
decision is not reached in a timely fashion. These negative reactions occur because unfair 
procedures convey information about one’s poor reputation and social standing in the group (see 
De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In the present research we solely focused on 
timing effects in the case of incorrect decisions.  
Hypotheses 
 Based on the theoretical framework presented above, it can be argued that when a 
delayed decision results in a negative outcome, this can be seen as especially harmful as not only 
outcome-related concerns, but also procedural fairness concerns are violated. Hence, in case of a 
delayed incorrect decision a double transgression has occurred, while in case of a timely 
incorrect decision solely outcome-related concerns are violated (i.e., a single transgression). Note 
that in case of a hasty incorrect decision procedural fairness concerns might also be violated, but 
to a lesser extent than after a delayed incorrect decision (cf. Valkeapää & Seppälä, 2014). This 
reasoning led us to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: A delayed incorrect decision is perceived as a more severe transgression 
than when the same incorrect decision is generated in a timely or a hasty manner. 
Hypothesis 1b: Procedural fairness concerns mediate the effect of a delayed incorrect 
decision (versus a timely and a hasty one) on harm severity.  
 With regard to the trust repair process, an apology communicates that the transgressor 
feels remorse and is willing to take responsibility for maintaining the relationship (Scher & 
Darley, 1997). Apologies are therefore considered a very effective mitigating account, which 
makes wrongs look a bit more right by working on relational needs (Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2005). 
Moreover, in the forgiveness literature it is reported that harm severity strengthens the need for 
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APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    11 
and relevance of actions that promote forgiveness (Pronk, Karremans, Overbeek, Vermulst, & 
Wigboldus, 2010). Based on this literature, we formulated the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In the aftermath of a leader’s failure, followers have a higher need for an 
apology when the leader made the incorrect decision that led to a negative outcome in a 
delayed way, than when this same negative outcome was generated in a timely or a hasty 
manner. 
 Regarding the effectiveness of apologies as a trust repair strategy, two competing 
hypotheses can be formulated. A first explanation is based on need satisfaction. When people 
experience a high need for an apology, it can be reasonably expected that the offer of an apology 
satisfies this need, which should lead to a host of positive reactions. Indeed, need satisfaction 
increases well-being, engagement, and self-esteem; an effect that can certainly be expected in the 
context of social relationships and social needs (Ryan & Deci, 2000). This explanation leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: In the aftermath of a leader’s failure, an apology is more effective for 
enhancing trustworthiness and trust repair after a delayed decision than after a timely 
decision or a hasty decision. 
 A second possibility, however, is that even though people express a high need for an 
apology after an incorrect and delayed decision, an apology will not be very effective under these 
circumstances. In this vein, studies on forgiveness have shown that harm severity lessens the 
effectiveness of apologies as a reconciliation strategy (Schlenker, 1985; Schoenbach, 1990). 
Here also, the need for trust restoration is at its highest level, but the effectiveness of an apology 
is hampered. Moreover, research of Ohbuchi and colleagues (1989) revealed that when the harm 
is more severe, the effectiveness of apologies was attenuated.  
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 Additionally, prior research has revealed that the presence versus absence of an apology 
is strongly linked to individuals’ perceptions of interactional fairness (see Clemmer & Schneider, 
1996; Goodwin & Ross, 1992; Smith, Bolton, & Wagner, 1999). Interactional fairness reflects 
the degree to which the people who are affected by certain decisions are treated with dignity and 
respect (Bies & Moag 1986; Goodwin & Ross, 1992). In this regard, previous studies which 
focused on the different fairness dimensions (i.e., distributive, procedural, and interactional) in 
the context of service recovery demonstrated that a financial compensation (which often 
enhances distributive fairness) is less effective for enhancing recovery when the other two 
dimensions of fairness are evaluated poorly (e.g., Blodgett, Hill, & Tax, 1997; Tax, Brown, & 
Chandrashekaran, 1998). In the context of the present research in which the leader’s incorrect 
decision violated followers’ outcome-related concerns (i.e., distributive fairness is thus low), it 
can similarly be expected that the provision of an apology (which can be seen as a recovery tool 
that aims to improve interactional fairness) is less effective as a means to repair trust when 
combined with low levels of procedural fairness (like when the decision is generated in a delayed 
manner) than when combined with moderate or high levels of procedural fairness (like in the 
case of a hasty and a timely decision). The following hypothesis can thus be formulated: 
Hypothesis 3b: In the aftermath of a leader’s failure, an apology is less effective for 
enhancing trustworthiness and trust repair after a delayed decision than after a timely 
decision or a hasty decision. 
The Present Studies 
We conducted five empirical studies that investigated how a negative decision outcome 
generated by a leader in a hasty, timely, or delayed manner impacts upon the trust repair process. 
More precisely, Study 1 was set up with the goal to investigate if a delayed incorrect decision is 
indeed perceived as a more severe transgression than a timely or a hasty incorrect decision. In 
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APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    13 
this study, we also explored the mediating role of procedural fairness concerns. Next, in Studies 
2 and 3, we examined in which decision timing condition followers had the highest need for 
an apology. Additionally, in Study 3 we examined differences among timing conditions in 
when followers expected an apology to be the most effective for enhancing trustworthiness. 
Finally, in Studies 4 and 5 the effectiveness of an actual apology (versus no apology) was 
investigated.  
Study 1 
Method  
Participants and design. A sample of 82 US employees (53 men, 29 women, Mage = 
31.55, SD = 8.88), which were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, completed an 
online scenario study in exchange for payment ($0.50). This platform has been demonstrated 
to be an appropriate method for recruiting subjects (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling 2011; 
Hauser & Schwarz, 2015). To safeguard data quality, we implemented multiple response 
reliability checks spread throughout the study (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 
2009). All participants answered these check questions correctly. The participants worked at 
least 12 hours per week and had a direct supervisor at work. On average, the participants 
worked for 4.30 years (SD = 4.23) in their current organization. They were randomly assigned 
to one condition of a 3-level (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) between-subjects 
design.  
Procedure. Participants were presented with a scenario about their supervisor at work. 
In this scenario, participants were asked to imagine as vividly as possible that the following 
situation happened to them: “Your supervisor made an incorrect decision which resulted in a 
negative outcome for you. As a result of this incorrect decision by your supervisor you 
received an unfavorable outcome.” 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    14 
Manipulation of decision timing. In the hasty condition, participants subsequently 
read the following text: “This incorrect decision was generated by your supervisor in a hasty 
manner. That is, the decision was made very fast and you hardly had to wait before the 
decision was reached.” For participants in the timely condition, it was stated that: “This 
incorrect decision was generated by your supervisor in a timely manner. That is, the decision 
was made at the appropriate moment in time and you only had to wait for a little while before 
the decision was reached.” Finally, in the delayed condition, participants learned that: “This 
incorrect decision was generated by your supervisor in a delayed manner. That is, the decision 
was made very slow and you had to wait for a long time before the decision was reached.” It 
is hard to investigate the effects of delays in the context of a scenario study because 
participants do not actually experience the delay. Therefore, in the delayed decision condition 
we added the following sentences in order to strengthen our timing manipulation: “Hence, it 
took your supervisor a very long time before he or she finally made a decision. Moreover, 
your supervisor was urged several times to make a decision, but he or she kept postponing the 
decision.” 
Measures. 
Procedural fairness. Participants were asked to evaluate the decision-making 
procedures employed in the leader’s decision with the procedural fairness scale of Valkeapää 
and Seppälä (2014). This scale consists of ten items, but one item (i.e., “Decisions are made in 
cabinets”) was excluded because it is not applicable to our study context. Before answering 
the scale participants were provided with the following information: “Your supervisor made 
an incorrect decision that negatively affected you. However, this decision might also have had 
consequences for other people who were also affected by this decision. To what extent do you 
think that your supervisor has made this incorrect decision so that” followed by the items. 
Sample items are: “All parties were treated equally in the decision-making process” and 
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“Everyone concerned had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process” (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much). The items were aggregated into a general measure of procedural 
fairness (M = 3.25, SD = 1.26, Cronbach’s α = .92). 
Harm severity. Next, the degree to which participants perceived the supervisor’s 
incorrect decision as a severe transgression was measured with a self-developed scale that 
consists of six items. Specifically, we asked participants: “To what extent do you find your 
supervisor’s decision a severe / harsh / serious / mild / soft / weak transgression” (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very much). The latter three items were reverse coded and subsequently the six items 
were combined into a general measure of harm severity (M = 4.47, SD = 1.27, Cronbach’s α = 
.84). 
Manipulation check. Finally, we checked the effectiveness of the decision timing 
manipulation with the following manipulation check: “How did your supervisor reach the 
decision?” (1 = in a fast manner, 7 = in a slow manner; M = 4.13, SD = 2.25). 
Results 
Manipulation check. We tested the effectiveness of our decision timing manipulation 
using a 3-level (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The main effect of decision timing was significant, F(2, 79) = 225.93, p < .001, hp2 = .85. A 
post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants in the delayed condition (M = 6.78, SD = 0.70) 
considered the decision as generated more slowly (ps < .001) than participants in the timely 
condition (M = 3.90, SD = 0.41) and those in the hasty condition (M = 1.65, SD = 1.32). 
Moreover, participants in the timely condition considered the decision to be reached more 
slowly than participants in the hasty condition (p < .001). These results indicate that our 
decision timing manipulation was effective. 
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Procedural fairness. A 3-level (decision timing) ANOVA on perceived procedural 
fairness showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 79) = 6.17, p = .003, hp2 = 
.14. A post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants in the delayed condition (M = 2.65, SD = 
0.95) perceived the decision as less procedural fair (ps < .05) than participants in the timely 
condition (M = 3.76, SD = 1.48) and those in the hasty condition (M = 3.30, SD = 1.04). 
Participants in the hasty and the timely condition did not differ significantly from each other 
(p = .160). 
Harm severity. A 3-level (decision timing) ANOVA on perceived harm severity also 
showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 79) = 7.09, p = .001, hp2 = .15. In 
agreement with Hypothesis 1a, a post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants in the delayed 
condition (M = 5.15, SD = 1.04) experienced the incorrect decision as a more severe 
transgression (ps < .007) than participants in the timely condition (M = 4.27, SD = 1.33) and 
those in the hasty condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.16). Again, participants in the hasty and the 
timely condition did not differ significantly from each other (p = .359). 
Mediating role of procedural fairness. Because the correlation between procedural 
fairness and harm severity was high (r = -.56, p < .001), we first checked whether these scales 
could be distinguished from each other by extracting two components from the inter-
correlations among the items of both scales. The two extracted factors had an eigenvalue of 
7.31 and 1.87 (explained variance of 48.76% and 12.49%, respectively). As expected, all nine 
procedural fairness items loaded on a first component (all component weights > .65, except 
one item which had a weight of .35), while the six harm severity items constituted a second, 
distinctive component (all component weights > .53). 
To test whether procedural fairness mediates the effects of decision timing on harm 
severity, we followed Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) analysis strategy to calculate direct and 
indirect effects using a multicategorical predictor (by employing the SPSS macro 
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MEDIATE). For the dummy that contrasted the delayed condition with the timely condition 
the mediation analysis confirmed that the indirect effect of decision timing on harm severity 
via procedural fairness was significant (b = -0.58, SE = 0.18, 95% CI: [-0.94, -0.22]). The 
direct effect of decision timing on harm severity became non-significant for this dummy (b = 
-0.30, SE = 0.29, p = .308). Moreover, the mediation analysis confirmed that for the dummy 
that contrasted the delayed condition with the hasty condition the indirect effect of decision 
timing on harm severity through procedural fairness was also significant (b = -0.34, SE = 
0.16, 95% CI: [-0.68, -0.06]). Here, however, the direct effect of decision timing on harm 
severity remained significant (b = -0.83, SE = 0.29, p = .005). The present results thus provide 
evidence for Hypothesis 1b, which states that procedural fairness mediates the effect of a 
delayed decision (versus a timely and a hasty decision) on harm severity. 
Discussion 
 The findings of the present study provide evidence for our first hypothesis. That is, in 
line with Hypothesis 1a, a delayed incorrect decision is indeed perceived as a more severe 
transgression than when the same incorrect decision was generated in a hasty or timely 
manner. Moreover, in agreement with Hypothesis 1b, the results also confirmed our 
expectation that a delayed incorrect decision is perceived as more severe because it also 
violates procedural fairness concerns, in addition to outcome-related ones. In the Introduction 
we additionally argued that a hasty incorrect decision might also be seen as a more severe 
transgression than a timely incorrect decision (but still less severe than a delayed incorrect 
decision). However, in the present study the differences between these two timing conditions 
failed to reach statistical significance. The next study was designed to examine how timing 
impacts victims’ need for the restoration of such incidents, by investigating whether the need 
for an apology is higher after a delayed incorrect decision than after a timely or hasty 
incorrect decision (Hypothesis 2). 
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Study 2 
Method 
Participants and design. A sample of 59 US employees (38 men, 21 women, Mage = 
33.81, SD = 10.29) recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk completed an online 
questionnaire study in exchange for payment ($0.50). All participants worked at least 12 
hours per week and had a direct supervisor at work. Participants worked on average 5.73 
years (SD = 4.25) in their current organization. Four participants (6.8%) were excluded from 
the analyses because they failed on our check questions. We employed a 3-level (decision 
timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) within-subjects design.  
Procedure. Participants were presented with a questionnaire study. We used the same 
scenario as in Study 1 in which participants were asked to imagine as vividly as possible that 
their own supervisor made an incorrect decision which resulted in a negative decision 
outcome for them.  
Manipulation of decision timing. Next, participants were asked to evaluate three 
situations (i.e., hasty, timely, and delayed) in which this incorrect decision could have been 
reached by their supervisor. These three decision timing conditions were framed in the same 
way as in Study 1. An important difference, however, is that in the present study decision 
timing was manipulated within instead of between subjects. In order to avoid sequential 
effects, the three decision timing conditions were presented to participants in a random order. 
Measures. 
Need for apology. For each of the three decision timing conditions, we probed 
participants’ need for an apology with three items (based on Leunissen et al., 2013): “To what 
extent does your supervisor need to apologize?”, “To what extent do you desire an apology 
from your supervisor?”, and “To what extent is it necessary that your supervisor offers his or 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    19 
her apologies?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). For each decision timing condition these items 
were combined into a need for apology measure (Cronbach’s α = .86, .89, and .84, for the 
hasty, timely, and delayed condition, respectively). The correlations among these three need 
for apology measures were rather high (all rs > .41, ps < .002). 
Manipulation check. We checked the effectiveness of the decision timing 
manipulation with the following manipulation check: “To what extent was your supervisor’s 
decision delayed?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants rated this question for each of 
the three decision timing conditions. 
Results 
Manipulation check. We conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), in which we included the manipulation check for each of the three decision timing 
conditions as within-subjects variables. The results of this analysis revealed a significant 
difference between the timing conditions on the manipulation check, F(2, 108) = 83.69, p < 
.001,  hp2 = .61. As expected, the delayed decision (M = 5.84, SD = 1.66) was perceived by 
participants as more delayed than the timely decision (M = 2.67, SD = 1.63), F(1, 54) = 80.44, p 
< .001, hp2 = .60, and the hasty decision (M = 2.07, SD = 1.62), F(1, 54) = 116.89, p < .001, hp2 
= .68. Furthermore, the timely decision was also perceived as more delayed than the hasty 
decision, F(1, 54) = 7.57, p = .008,  hp2 = .12. These findings thus indicate that our decision 
timing manipulation was effective. 
Need for apology. Next, a repeated measures ANOVA with the three need for 
apology measures as within-subjects variables was conducted. The results of this analysis 
revealed a significant difference between the decision timing conditions on the need for apology 
measure, F(2, 108) = 8.84, p < .001,  hp2 = .14. The contrasts were planned in accordance with 
Hypothesis 2. As predicted, after the delayed decision (M = 5.37, SD = 1.29) participants had a 
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higher need for an apology than after the timely decision (M = 4.64, SD = 1.47), F(1, 54) = 13.18, 
p = .001, hp2 = .20, and the hasty decision (M = 4.99, SD = 1.47), F(1, 54) = 4.04, p = .049,  hp2 
= .07. In addition, after the hasty decision participants also indicated a higher need for an 
apology than after the timely decision, F(1, 54) = 8.26, p = .006,  hp2 = .13. 
Discussion 
In line with Hypothesis 2, our results showed that after the delayed incorrect decision the 
need for an apology was higher than after both the hasty and the timely decision. Moreover, in 
the present study this need was also significantly greater after the hasty than after the timely 
decision, thus indicating that a hasty decision might be seen as a more severe transgression than a 
timely decision. Study 3 aims to replicate the present findings using a lab experiment instead of a 
questionnaire study. Moreover, we also measured the expected effectiveness of an apology in 
Study 3 in order to investigate whether participants anticipated an apology to be more effective 
(Hypothesis 3a) or less effective (Hypothesis 3b) as a means to enhance trustworthiness after a 
delayed incorrect decision than after a timely or hasty incorrect decision. 
Study 3 
Method 
Participants and design. A sample of 95 undergraduate college students (12 men, 83 
women, Mage = 19.68, SD = 1.61) participated in this experiment for course credit. One of 
these participants was not included in the analyses due to a data storage error. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one condition of a 3-level (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. 
delayed) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were each seated in front of a 
computer. They were informed that they would work together with other participants present 
in the lab on several tasks, and that one participant was assigned as their leader (in fact, 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR    21 
unbeknownst to participants, the leader and his or her actions during the experiment were 
programmed). Their group was called ‘Team Green’. Participants were then informed that the 
task would consist of two stages. In the first stage, participants would perform an individual 
task, in which they could earn money for the group. In the second stage, the simulated leader 
would make an investment decision with the group’s earnings from the first stage. 
After receiving this information, the first stage of the group task started. Participants 
learned that they should solve as many anagrams (e.g., ‘ixat’ = ‘taxi’) as possible in six 
minutes. Each anagram they solved earned money for their group, thereby increasing its 
chance of winning cinema tickets. On average, participants solved 19.44 anagrams (SD = 
5.31). Upon completion of this task, participants were informed that the number of anagrams 
solved by each individual were pooled together to represent a group score, and that this group 
score was converted into a group-revenue.  
In the second stage of the task, participants were told that the leader (whose behavior 
was simulated) would perform an investment task on behalf of the group, in which he or she 
would decide how the group’s revenue from the first stage would be invested. Participants 
learned that to this end, the leader had to compare two possible investment options (i.e., 
‘research and development’ and ‘marketing’), and decide in which of these options the money 
would be invested. If the leader selected the correct alternative, the revenue that the group had 
earned would be multiplied, and the participants would be certain to earn the prize. However, 
if the leader selected the incorrect alternative, the group’s revenue would be lost, and their 
chance of winning the prize would be squandered.  
Although in this stage only the leader performed a task, participants could observe the 
leader while making this decision. As such, participants were able to observe on their screen 
which information the leader was consulting while performing the investment task, and could 
monitor at which time the leader made his or her decision. Through this procedure, we could 
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administer our manipulation of decision timing. Importantly, in all three decision timing 
conditions, the leader consulted the information regarding the two investment options in a 
fixed, consistent order.  
Manipulation of decision timing. Before the start of the second stage, we explained 
participants that the leader received six minutes to complete the investment task, and that it 
was crucial that the leader made his or her decision before the deadline. We provided such an 
explicit standard because in real-life leaders are often confronted with predefined deadlines. 
The first three minutes (i.e., the ‘reading phase’) were intended for the leader to carefully read 
the description of the two investments, whereas the final three minutes (i.e., the ‘decision 
phase’) were intended for the leader to decide between the two investment options. Our 
manipulation of decision timing varied how much time the leader took to make his or her 
decision. Participants could follow this time course by a clock that was displayed on the 
middle of their screen.  
In the hasty condition, the leader was preprogrammed to decide already after 45 
seconds, long before the reading phase had concluded and the decision phase had 
commenced. In the timely condition and the delayed condition, after exactly 3:00 minutes a 
message was displayed which informed the leader that the reading phase was over and the 
decision phase would start. Subsequently, in the timely condition, the leader decided after 
3:45 minutes. Yet, in the delayed condition the leader kept further postponing his or her 
decision. After 5:45 minutes a last warning message appeared on the screen which informed 
the leader that time was running out and that he or she immediately had to make a decision. 
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However, in this condition the leader decided just after six minutes, the moment that the 
decision deadline passed.1 
Finally, the outcomes of the task were revealed. In all three decision timing conditions, 
the leader selected the incorrect investment option, which yielded an unfavorable outcome as 
it caused the participants to lose all the money that they had earned in stage 1.  
Measures. 
Need for apology. We measured participants’ need for an apology with the same three 
items as in Study 2 (M = 4.52, SD = 1.67, Cronbach’s a = .90). 
Effectiveness of apology. To probe the extent to which participants expected an 
apology to be an effective strategy to enhance the trustworthiness of their leader, we used an 
abridged version (nine items) of the trustworthiness scale of Mayer and Davis (1999) that was 
adapted to the context of the offer of an apology. Sample items are: “To what extent would an 
apology be effective to restore your faith in your leader’s competence?” and “To what extent 
would an apology be effective to restore your faith that your leader is concerned about the 
welfare of his or her followers?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The items were aggregated 
into a general measure of the perceived effectiveness of an apology (M = 4.27, SD = 1.10, 
Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the decision timing manipulation was 
measured with the same manipulation check as in Study 2 (M = 4.06, SD = 2.33). 
Results 
                                                          
1 To provide an additional point of reference for the timeliness of the leader’s decision, in all three decision 
timing conditions, we also displayed a notice when the leader of ‘Team Red’ − another group that 
simultaneously performed the study − had made his or her decision. This message was shown after 3:45 minutes 
(on average; the program randomly selected a value between 3:43 and 3:47). Although both groups performed 
the task individually and were not in competition for the prize, highlighting the timing of ‘Team Red’ provides a 
useful reference point for participants to judge the timeliness of their leader’s decision. 
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Manipulation check. We tested the effectiveness of our decision timing manipulation 
using a 3-level (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) ANOVA. The main effect of 
decision timing was significant, F(2, 91) = 162.11, p < .001, hp2 = .78. A post hoc test (LSD) 
showed that participants in the delayed condition (M = 6.83, SD = 0.60) considered the 
decision as more delayed (ps < .001) than participants in the timely condition (M = 3.91, SD = 
1.33) and those in the hasty condition (M = 1.79, SD = 1.19). Furthermore, participants in the 
timely condition considered the decision more delayed than those in the hasty condition (p < 
.001). The decision timing manipulation was thus effective. 
Need for apology. A 3-level (decision timing) ANOVA on participants’ need for an 
apology showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 91) = 20.08, p < .001, hp2 = 
.31. In agreement with Hypothesis 2, a post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants in the 
delayed condition (M = 5.86, SD = 0.90) had a higher need for an apology (ps < .001) than 
participants in the timely condition (M = 3.67, SD = 1.62) and those in the hasty condition (M 
= 4.16, SD = 1.55). In the present study, participants in the hasty and the timely condition did 
not differ significantly from each other (p = .160). 
Effectiveness of apology. A 3-level (decision timing) ANOVA on participant’s 
perceived effectiveness of an apology showed a significant main effect of decision timing, 
F(2, 91) = 4.91, p = .009, hp2 = .10. As predicted by Hypothesis 3b, a post hoc test (LSD) 
showed that participants in the delayed condition (M = 3.78, SD = 1.41) expected an apology 
to be less (instead of more) effective (ps < .05) to enhance their trustworthiness of the leader 
compared to participants in the timely condition (M = 4.61, SD = 0.98) and those in the hasty 
condition (M = 4.37, SD = 0.74). Here too, the difference between the hasty and the timely 
condition was non-significant (p = .356). 
Discussion 
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 The present results provide further evidence for Hypothesis 2, by showing that 
participants have a higher need for an apology when they experience a negative outcome 
generated by their leader in a delayed way than when this same outcome was produced in a 
timely or hasty manner. At the same time, participants expected an apology to be less 
effective to enhance trustworthiness of their leader after a delayed decision than after a timely 
or hasty decision (Hypothesis 3b). These findings thus show a remarkable paradox: The need 
for an apology is highest when a decision is delayed, but at the same time an apology is 
expected to be the least effective strategy under such circumstances. This is also reflected in 
the negative correlation between the need for an apology and the effectiveness of an apology 
in the delayed decision timing condition (r = -.34, p = .07). Note that in the previous study 
participants in the hasty condition reported a higher need for an apology than participants in 
the timely condition. In the present study this difference was non-significant. However, the 
present study only informs us about the expected effectiveness of an apology but not about the 
actual effectiveness of such an apology. Therefore, in the next study we explicitly tested the 
effectiveness of an apology (versus no apology). 
Study 4 
Method 
Participants and design. A sample of 146 undergraduate university students (31 men, 
109 women, Mage = 19.09, SD = 1.87) participated in this study for course credit. Gender and 
age of six participants were not recorded due to a programming error. We employed a 3 
(decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. apology) 
between-subjects design. 
Procedure. We adopted the same procedure and the same decision timing 
manipulation as in Study 3, only now, the leader either did or did not provide an apology for 
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his or her incorrect decision. On average, participants solved 18.86 anagrams (SD = 5.98) in 
the first stage of the group task. 
Manipulation of apology. After the negative outcome of the investment task had been 
revealed, participants were informed that the leader had the opportunity to send them a 
message. In the no apology condition, participants were told that the leader had not taken up 
the possibility to send them a message. In the apology condition, the leader stated: “I want to 
apologize to everyone. I made a mistake. I promise you that this will never happen again.” 
Note that the apology message was targeted at all group members and contained the 
acceptance of responsibility, admittance of wrongdoing, and a promise of forbearance, three 
essential components of a persuasive apology (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Scher & Darley, 
1997).  
Measures. 
Trustworthiness. To assess perceived trustworthiness of the leader, we employed the 
full ability, benevolence, and integrity subscales of the trustworthiness measure (17 items) 
developed by Mayer and Davis (1999). Sample items are: “I have faith in the qualities of the 
leader (ability)”, “The leader places importance on the welfare of me and the team 
(benevolence)”, and “The leader’s actions and behaviors are not very consistent (integrity)” (1 
= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; negative item reverse-coded). Because of the high 
correlations between the three facet scales (all rs > .65, ps < .001), the 17 items were 
aggregated into a general scale measure of trustworthiness (M = 3.79, SD = 0.85, Cronbach’s 
α = .94).  
Trust. To probe participants’ trusting intentions towards the leader we employed the 
six item trust scale of Desmet, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2011). Sample items are: “I trust the 
leader” and “I think that the leader would deceive me if he or she would benefit from it” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; negative items reverse-coded). The six trust items were 
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aggregated into a scale measure of participants’ trusting intentions (M = 4.05, SD = 0.98, 
Cronbach’s α = .86). 
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the decision timing manipulation was 
checked with the same manipulation check as in Study 2 (M = 4.08, SD = 2.15). 
Results 
Manipulation check. We tested the effectiveness of our decision timing manipulation 
using a 3 (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. 
apology) ANOVA. The results showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 140) 
= 98.84, p < .001, hp2 = .59. As expected, a post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants in 
the delayed condition (M = 6.35, SD = 1.26) considered the decision as more delayed (ps < 
.001) than participants in the timely condition (M = 3.45, SD = 1.46) and those in the hasty 
condition (M = 2.49, SD = 1.47). Furthermore, participants in the timely condition considered 
the decision more delayed than those in the hasty condition (p = .001). The main effect of 
apology and the interaction effect were non-significant (both Fs < 0.67, ps > .414). Again, the 
results indicate that our decision timing manipulation was effective. 
Trustworthiness. A 3 (decision timing) × 2 (apology) ANOVA on trustworthiness2 
showed significant main effects of decision timing, F(2, 140) = 5.96, p = .003, hp2 = .08, and 
apology, F(1, 140) = 16.23, p < .001, hp2 = .10. The results showed that these effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction between decision timing and apology, F(2, 140) = 4.17, p 
= .017, hp2 = .06. We conducted simple effects tests to further analyze this interaction. Means 
and standard deviations for the corresponding conditions are presented in Table 1. 
                                                          
2 ANOVAs and subsequent simple effects tests for the trustworthiness facet scales of ability, benevolence, and 
integrity led to similar conclusions as the ones reported here for the total scale. 
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In line with the predictions made in Hypothesis 3b, an apology was less effective in 
enhancing trustworthiness in the delayed condition than in the timely condition (p < .001) and 
the hasty condition (p = .006). Moreover, an apology was slightly more effective in the timely 
condition than in the hasty condition (p = .091). When participants did not receive an apology, 
there was no significant difference between the hasty, timely, and delayed conditions (ps > 
.536). Whereas these results indicate that an apology is less effective in enhancing 
trustworthiness after a delayed decision than after a timely and a hasty one, it does not inform 
us about how effective an apology exactly is in each of the three decision timing conditions. 
We therefore performed additional simple effects tests which revealed that an apology is more 
effective to enhance trustworthiness than no apology after both a hasty decision (p = .018) and 
a timely decision (p < .001). After a delayed decision, however, an apology is not more 
effective than no apology to increase trustworthiness (p = .803). 
Trust. A 3 (decision timing) × 2 (apology) ANOVA on trust showed significant main 
effects of decision timing, F(2, 140) = 4.79, p = .01, hp2 = .06, and apology, F(1, 140) = 
15.63, p < .001, hp2 = .10. The interaction effect of decision timing and apology, however, 
revealed a tendency towards statistical significance, F(2, 140) = 2.86, p = .060, hp2 = .04. We 
further analyzed this almost significant interaction with simple effects tests in order to explore 
whether we could replicate the results reported for trustworthiness for actual trust. Because 
the interaction failed to reach statistical significance at the .05 level, the results presented 
below should be interpreted with caution. Means and standard deviations for the 
corresponding conditions are presented in Table 1.  
In agreement with Hypothesis 3b, an apology was less effective to repair trust in the 
delayed condition than in the timely condition (p < .001) and the hasty condition (p = .017); 
while there was no significant difference between the hasty condition and the timely condition 
(p = .153). Moreover, when participants did not receive an apology, the three timing 
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conditions did not differ significantly from each other (ps > .493). Additional simple effects 
tests showed that an apology is more effective to repair trust than no apology in both the hasty 
condition (p = .023) and the timely condition (p < .001). After a delayed decision, an apology 
is not more effective than no apology in restoring trust (p = .566). Hence, the analyses 
revealed similar results for trustworthiness and trust, which can be ascribed to the high 
correlation between these two concepts (r = .79, p < .001). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Discussion 
In support of Hypothesis 3b, the current study demonstrates that in the aftermath of a 
leader failure, the provision of an apology is less effective in restoring trustworthiness and 
trust after a delayed incorrect decision compared to a timely and a hasty incorrect decision. 
Moreover, the difference between the hasty and timely condition was marginally significant 
for trustworthiness, but non-significant for trust. It should, however, be noted that the decision 
timing by apology interaction revealed only a tendency towards statistical significance for the 
trust scale, and the results of the simple effects tests should therefore be interpreted with 
caution. In order to replicate the present results we conducted an additional study in which we 
used an employee sample to investigate the effectiveness of an apology in restoring trust. 
Study 5 
Method 
Participants and design. A sample of 151 US employees (87 men, 64 women, Mage = 
34.92, SD = 10.48) was recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. They completed an 
online scenario study in exchange for payment ($0.50). All participants worked at least 12 
hours per week and had a direct supervisor at work. Participants worked on average 5.97 
years (SD = 5.13) in their current organization. Twelve participants (7.9%) were excluded 
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from further analyses because they failed on our check questions. As in the previous study, we 
employed a 3 (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. 
apology) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. As in Study 1, participants were presented with a short scenario in which 
they were asked to imagine as vividly as possible that their supervisor made an incorrect 
decision which resulted in a negative decision outcome for them.  
Manipulation of decision timing. Similar to the first study, in the hasty condition 
participants read that the incorrect decision by their supervisor was made in a hasty manner, 
in the timely condition the incorrect decision was generated in a timely fashion, and in the 
delayed condition the incorrect decision was described as being delayed (for the precise 
formulations, see the Method section of Study 1). 
Manipulation of apology. In the no apology condition, it was stated that no further 
communication regarding this incidence took place. In the apology condition, participants 
were told that their supervisor apologized for what happened by stating: “I want to apologize 
to you. I made a mistake. I promise you that this will never happen again.” As in the previous 
study, the apology message contained the three essential components of a persuasive apology.  
Measures. 
Trust. We measured participants trust in their leader with the same six items as in 
Study 4 (M = 4.02, SD = 1.55, Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the decision timing manipulation was 
probed with the same manipulation check as in Study 2 (M = 3.55, SD = 2.35).  
Results 
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of our decision timing manipulation was 
tested using a 3 (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. 
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apology) ANOVA. The results showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 133) 
= 128.23, p < .001, hp2 = .66. As expected, a post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants in 
the delayed condition (M = 6.27, SD = 1.14) considered the decision as more delayed (ps < 
.001) than participants in the timely condition (M = 2.47, SD = 1.63) and those in the hasty 
condition (M = 2.04, SD = 1.37). Although the difference is in the expected direction, the 
timely and the hasty condition did not differ significantly from each other (p = .145). The 
main effect of apology and the interaction effect were non-significant (both Fs < 2.14, ps > 
.146).  
Trust. A 3 (decision timing) × 2 (apology) ANOVA on trust showed significant main 
effects of decision timing, F(2, 133) = 11.39, p < .001, hp2 = .15, and apology, F(1, 133) = 
19.72, p < .001, hp2 = .13. The results showed that these effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction between decision timing and apology, F(2, 133) = 3.57, p = .031, hp2 = .05. We 
conducted simple effects tests to further analyze this interaction. Means and standard 
deviations for the corresponding conditions are presented in Table 2.  
In agreement with Hypothesis 3b, an apology was less effective to repair trust in the 
delayed condition than in the timely condition (p < .001) and the hasty condition (p = .012). 
Moreover, in the hasty condition an apology was less effective than in the timely condition (p 
= .007). As in the previous study, when participants did not receive an apology, the three 
decision timing conditions did not differ significantly from each other (ps > .129). Additional 
simple effects tests showed that an apology is more effective to repair trust than no apology in 
both the hasty condition (p = .016) and the timely condition (p < .001). After a delayed 
decision, an apology is not more effective than no apology for restoring trust (p = .463). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Discussion 
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 The present study replicates the findings of Study 4. That is, in agreement with 
Hypothesis 3b, the results showed that an apology is less effective in restoring trust after a 
delayed incorrect decision compared to a timely and a hasty incorrect decision. Here, the 
difference between the hasty and the timely condition was significant, once again indicating 
that a hasty decision might be seen as a more severe transgression than a timely decision. 
Summary and Concluding Discussion 
 Although trust is a vital ingredient of effective leader-follower relationships, it is not 
uncommon that leaders violate their followers’ trust by making decisions that result in a 
negative outcome. When the failure to reach a desired outcome is ascribed to the leader, 
followers’ trust in the leader will subsequently decline. One way in which leaders can repair 
broken trust is by apologizing for their mistakes. Importantly, however, restoration of trust 
may depend not only on the negative outcomes that result from such decisions, but also on the 
timing of those decisions. In spite of the ubiquity of timing errors in daily life, such 
transgressions have received only scant attention in research. To the best of our knowledge, 
no research has focused on the role of timeliness of decisions in trust repair yet. We therefore 
investigated decision timing as an important feature of decision style that may influence the 
effectiveness of apologies as a trust repair strategy in leader-follower relationships. 
Main Conclusions 
In accordance with Hypothesis 1a, the results of Study 1 revealed that when a negative 
outcome is generated by a leader in a delayed manner, this is perceived by followers as a 
more severe transgression than when the same negative outcome is generated in a timely or 
hasty fashion. Moreover, our findings revealed that procedural fairness mediates the effect of 
a delayed decision on harm severity (Hypothesis 1b). Hence, our findings indicate that a 
delayed incorrect decision can be seen as a more severe transgression as it violates both 
outcome-related and procedural fairness concerns. The present findings thus corroborate 
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recent research by Valkeapää and Seppälä (2014), who also reported that especially slow 
decision-making styles violate procedural fairness concerns.  
Moreover, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, the results of Studies 2 and 3 showed that the 
need for an apology is higher after a delayed incorrect decision than after a timely and a hasty 
incorrect decision. This result supports findings done in fairness research, which have 
convincingly showed that negative decision outcomes prompt people to be more sensitive for 
unfair procedures (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). A combination of low procedural fairness 
and low outcome favorability––like in the case of a delayed incorrect decision––can thus be 
expected to elicit a high need for actions that reestablish the social relationship, such as the 
offer of an apology (see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The results of our 
studies also corroborate prior forgiveness research, which has shown that the need for actions 
that promote reconciliation is strengthened by harm severity (Pronk et al., 2010).  
Finally, in accordance with Hypothesis 3b (and opposite to the predictions made by the 
competing Hypothesis 3a) Study 3 also revealed that followers expected an apology to be less 
(instead of more) effective to increase trustworthiness when the negative decision outcome 
was delayed relative to timely or hasty. In Study 4, we replicated this effect for actual 
apologies on trustworthiness and trust. Although in this instance the effect on trust was only 
marginally significant, and therefore should be interpreted with caution, this effect was 
replicated with statistical significance in Study 5. These results thus corroborate forgiveness 
research, which has demonstrated that after severe transgressions, when the need for trust 
restoration is at a high level, apologies are ineffective to enhance reconciliation (e.g., see 
Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Schlenker, 1985; Schoenbach, 1990). Moreover, the finding that in the 
aftermath of an incorrect decision (which results in low distributive fairness) the provision of 
an apology (which aims to enhance interactional fairness) was ineffective to repair trust when 
procedural fairness concerns were also violated (like in the case of a delay) is also in line with 
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previous research that focused on the different fairness dimensions in the context of service 
recovery efforts. Specifically, this prior research has demonstrated that the effectiveness of a 
recovery strategy that enhances one specific fairness dimension is lessened when the other 
two fairness dimensions are not well secured (see Blodgett et al., 1997; Tax et al., 1998). 
Taken together, the present findings thus present us with an interesting paradox: Even 
though the need for an apology is highest when a decision is delayed (compared to timely or 
hasty), an apology proved to be the least effective to enhance trustworthiness and repair actual 
trust in the delayed decision timing condition.  
In the remainder of the discussion, we first elaborate on the differences between hasty 
and timely decisions. Secondly, we focus on the theoretical and practical implications that can 
be derived from the current research. Next, we address the question whether trust can be 
repaired after a delayed decision. Finally, we describe some strengths and limitations of the 
present studies, and formulate some recommendations for future research.  
Differences between Hasty and Timely Decisions 
 Note that the present research mainly focused on delayed decisions, which were 
contrasted with hasty and timely decisions. However, as argued in the introduction, it is 
possible that hasty decisions might also differ from timely ones. Based on prior research of 
Valkeapää and Seppälä (2014), it can be predicted that in the case of a hasty decision 
procedural fairness concerns will also be violated (but to a lesser extent than after a delay). As 
a result, a hasty incorrect decision might be seen as a more severe transgression, which 
engenders a higher need for an apology, than a timely incorrect decision. Our results partially 
confirmed these predictions.  
 That is, although no significant differences between the hasty and the timely condition 
emerged in terms of perceived procedural fairness and harm severity (Study 1), need for and 
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expected effectiveness of an apology (Study 3), and enhanced trust and trustworthiness after 
receiving an apology (Study 4); we obtained significant results for need for an apology in 
Study 2 and for trust in Study 5. This inconsistency between Studies 2 and 3 can possibly be 
ascribed to the fact that the second study employed a within-subjects design to manipulate 
decision timing. Such a design results in substantially more sensitivity to a manipulation than 
a between-subjects design that contains approximate the same number of observations 
(Greenwald, 1976).  
 To conclude, based on our findings it thus seems plausible that hasty and timely 
decisions are also experienced differently. It might be interesting for future research to further 
investigate the difference between hasty and timely decisions, and, more specifically, when 
hasty and timely decisions exactly differ and when they do not. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications  
The first important contribution of the present research is that it shows that a lack of 
timeliness is a crucial transgression dimension that has powerful effects on trust and 
trustworthiness. Prior research has focused heavily on trust violations as being either 
competence- or integrity-based (for an overview on this matter, see Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 
2009). However, our results show that while an apology (compared to no apology) was 
effective in enhancing trustworthiness and trust repair following a leader’s incorrect hasty and 
timely responses, this was no longer the case after a delay. Our findings thus suggest that, 
besides competence and integrity violations, delays can be considered a distinct type of trust 
violation. Based on our findings, it can be concluded that timeliness represents an important 
extension for literature on trust repair.  
This research also highlights an additional issue that deserves particular attention of 
leaders who in everyday life must make numerous decisions that can affect their followers. 
Specifically, in our studies we examined timing errors in a context in which followers 
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depended on the actions of their leader, and the leader’s delay constituted a clear threat to 
their interests. Such situations frequently occur in organizations, where leaders are regularly 
faced with deadlines. Prior work on timing in organizations has suggested that subordinates 
develop strong temporal expectations, which often get violated in the form of delays (Blount 
& Janick, 2001; Tukel & Rom, 1998). Moreover, ample research has shown that delayed 
decisions can have severe consequences in terms of negative leadership perceptions, lowered 
team effectiveness, and decreased organizational performance (e.g., Cha & Edmonston, 2006; 
Jacobs, 2005; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005; Mohammed et al., 2009). 
Our findings supplement the adverse consequences of delays by showing its negative 
effects on trustworthiness and trust. Together these findings show that even when leaders are 
overwhelmed by the large number of decisions they have to address, it is better for them to 
give preference to fast over delayed actions. This view is congruent with literature on action 
bias (e.g., Bar-Eli, Azar, Ritov, Keidar-Levin, & Shein, 2007), which states that people tend 
to evaluate others more positively if they take action rather than do nothing, regardless of 
whether this action proves optimal relative to the outcome. From the above, we can thus 
conclude that leaders should be informed that missing a deadline can have severe 
ramifications, which can be hard to reconcile by usual means such as the offer of an apology. 
Can Trust be Repaired After a Delayed Incorrect Decision? 
The question that arises is whether trust can be repaired in the aftermath of a delayed 
incorrect decision. While in the present research apologies were ineffective for restoring trust 
after delays (despite containing the three essential components, see Scher & Darley, 1997), it 
is possible that more elaborated, complex, or intense apologies might be more effective. 
Schlenker and Darby (1981), for example, suggested that people tend to use more complex 
apologies involving a larger number of components as the harm done gets more serious. For 
instance, a more explicit promise of future trustworthy behavior may be necessary in order to 
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restore trust after a delayed incorrect decision. Moreover, after a delayed incorrect decision an 
apology might be seen as only a first and necessary step that subsequently needs to be backed 
up with more reliable behavior in order to successfully repair trust. The process of trust repair 
in response to a delayed decision may thus be a process of longer duration, in which trust can 
only be rebuilt gradually over time.  
In addition, prior trust repair research has revealed that, besides apologies, there are 
many other strategies that can repair broken trust. For instance, because in the present 
research the leader’s decision resulted in a negative decision outcome, strategies that address 
violated outcome-related concerns might be necessary to repair broken trust. The offer of a 
financial compensation is an example of such a strategy (see Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, 
De Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013; Desmet et al., 2011). It is thus possible that the ‘cheap talk’ of 
an apology should be substantiated with at least some sort of tangibility in order to initiate the 
recovery process.  
Strengths and Limitations  
Evidence for our hypotheses was obtained using five empirical studies in which we 
manipulated decision timing (in Studies 1 through 5) and apology (in Studies 4 and 5). An 
advantage of studying human behavior using experimental manipulations is that it allows us 
to investigate the processes of decision timing and trust repair in a controlled environment. In 
the experimental studies, we thus gave priority to the goals of precision, controllability, and 
consistency. However, these priorities were emphasized at the expense of generalizability. In 
order to enlarge the generalizability of our findings, three of our studies (i.e., Studies 1, 2, and 
5) were conducted among followers who answered our study questions for their own leader. 
The inclusion of followers in organizational settings provides evidence for the robustness of 
our findings. 
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Secondly, despite the conceptual differences between trustworthiness and trust (see 
Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995), our results revealed that an apology was effective to 
enhance both trustworthiness and actual trust after a hasty and a timely decision, but 
ineffective after a delayed decision. The observation that we could replicate this effect across 
both trust concepts further underlines the robustness of our findings. However, this result is 
not too surprising because despite their differences these two concepts are also closely related 
to each other (i.e., “one trusts someone because she is trustworthy, and one’s trustworthiness 
inspires trust”; see Flores & Solomon, 1998, p. 209). This is also reflected by the high 
correlation (r = .79) between trustworthiness and trust in our fourth study.  
A major limitation of the present research, however, is that in our studies the concepts 
of trust and trustworthiness were both measured using a snapshot approach. In real-life trust is 
a more dynamic construct that fluctuates over time (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009). The 
investigation of trust as a dynamic construct thus requires multiple measurements over time. 
A vital recommendation for further research is therefore to take the dynamic nature of trust 
into consideration when investigating the trust repair process.  
Moreover, a specific restriction of our Mechanical Turk studies (i.e., Studies 1, 2, and 
5) is that the scenarios that we employed were all framed in rather general terms. That is, in 
these studies no specific information regarding the decision-making process was provided 
because this would make it increasingly likely that certain parts of the scenario would diverge 
from what participants actually experience in their daily life. Nonetheless, we should 
acknowledge that the use of context free scenarios may have led to a decreased intensity of 
the participants’ experiences. This methodological choice may also threaten the ecological 
validity of our findings, as in real-life situations many different factors−−such as for instance 
the intensity of the trust violation and the history of the relationship between the leader and 
his or her followers−−may also influence the trust repair process. We believe that it would be 
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interesting for further studies to discover important contextual factors that might influence the 
trust restoration process in actual business settings and encourage future research to take these 
different elements into account. 
Directions for Future Research 
The present research provides only an overall test of the effects of decision timing on 
trust repair in the aftermath of leader failure. As argued above, future studies should aim to 
understand which contextual factors may impact the effect of timing on trust, and the 
processes that may explain this effect.  
First of all, future studies should examine the impact of timing errors in the context of 
correct decisions (instead of incorrect ones). In order to be able to investigate the trust repair 
process, we solely focused on situations in which the failure of the leader resulted in an 
equivalent negative outcome for followers. Based on the present results, it is unclear which 
consequences may arise when a leader makes a decision that results in favorable outcomes in 
a delayed manner. It is possible that the adverse effects of delays, which we noted in the 
present studies, will be less pronounced when the output of the decision is positive (cf. 
Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Additional research is needed to examine this prediction. 
Moreover, to investigate the effectiveness of apologies as a means to repair trust in the 
aftermath of leader failure, in our studies decision timing was manipulated in such a way that 
it was clear to participants that the leader him- or herself was responsible for the negative 
decision outcome. If the cause of a delay can be attributed to factors other than the leader, it 
can be expected that the leader will not be seen as the prime responsible, which might alter 
the effectiveness of the provision of an apology to establish trust repair. The investigation of 
the role of such attributions is an important avenue for future research. 
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Additional research should also examine the social context in which the timing 
violation occurred. In this regard, future studies can, for instance, investigate the role of 
leader-member exchanges (LMX) in the trust repair process after different timing 
transgressions (see Gómez & Rosen, 2001; Liden & Graen, 1980), as the quality of these 
leader-member exchange relationships might influence the effectiveness of apologies. It is 
possible that an apology will be more effective to enhance trust after a delayed incorrect 
decision when the quality of the relationship between the leader and his or her follower is 
rated highly. This prediction should also be validated in future research. 
Finally, the present research has primarily understood the effect of timing in terms of 
its violation of fairness concerns. Although our results revealed that fairness can (partially) 
explain the effects of delayed decision making, it must be acknowledged that in the present 
research we only took the mediating role of procedural fairness into account. Yet, it is 
possible that timing violations do not only violate norms of fair treatment, but also norms of 
politeness and respect (i.e., interactional fairness). Therefore, it is important that future timing 
research also includes a measurement of interactional fairness in addition to procedural 
fairness. 
Conclusion 
The present research was the first to systematically study how the timing of an 
incorrect decision influences the need for, and the effectiveness of an apology as a trust repair 
strategy. The results of our studies revealed that the need for an apology was highest when an 
incorrect decision was preceded by delay, whereas apologies in fact were ineffective for 
repairing trust in this context. Leaders would thus be wise to bear in mind that even when the 
outcome of a decision is uncertain, it is better to decide (too) soon rather than (too) late, as 
negative outcomes are particularly difficult to restore in the context of delays. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Trustworthiness and Trust (Study 4) 
Dependent variable Decision timing condition Apology condition 
  No apology Apology Total 
  M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Trustworthiness Hasty 3.60 0.66 23 4.12 0.56 26 3.87 0.66 49 
 Timely 3.53 0.82 24 4.48 0.71 25 4.02 0.90 49 
 Delayed 3.46 0.94 25 3.51 0.85 23 3.49 0.89 48 
 Total 3.53 0.81 72 4.05 0.81 74 3.79 0.85 146 
Trust Hasty 3.83 0.63 23 4.42 0.81 26 4.14 0.78 49 
 Timely 3.76 1.12 24 4.79 0.97 25 4.28 1.16 49 
 Delayed 3.65 0.95 25 3.80 0.87 23 3.72 0.90 48 
 Total 3.74 0.91 72 4.35 0.96 74 4.05 0.98 146 
Note. Higher mean scores indicate greater trust(worthiness).  
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Trust (Study 5) 
Decision timing condition Apology condition 
 No apology Apology Total 
 M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Hasty 3.57 1.36 25 4.52 1.22 24 4.04 1.37 49 
Timely 3.80 1.82 23 5.61 1.08 22 4.69 1.75 45 
Delayed 3.19 1.42 24 3.49 1.01 21 3.33 1.24 45 
Total 3.52 1.54 72 4.56 1.39 67 4.02 1.55 139 
Note. Higher mean scores indicate greater trust.  
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